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Cavers: Effect of Disaffirmance by an Infant of His Indorsement of Negoti
EDITORIAL NOTES
EFFECT OF DISAFFIRMANCE BY AN INFANT OF HIS INDORSEMENT OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER.-An infant payee of a negotiable

promissory note, after having indorsed it apparently in blank, delivered the instrument to his attorney who promptly deposited it
with the defendant bank as collateral security for his own note.
Upon learning of his attorney's embezzlement, the infant, both
before and after attaining his majority, repudiated the indorsement, and upon the refusal of the bank to return the note, brought
suit for its recovery. The bank had taken the note in ignorance
of the indorser's infancy. A decree in favor of the defendant was
reversed on appeal. Strothers v. Lynchburg Trust & Savings
Ban.'
The relevant provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law
does not foreclose the question. In providing that an infant's indorsement "passes the property" to the indorsee, Section 22' was
clearly intended to codify the commn law rule that an antecedent
party may not plead an indorser's infancy in an action by the
indorsee,' but it leaves latent an ambiguity whether the title so
passed is subject to disaffirmance.' Unaided by explicit statutory
provisions, the court was therefore obliged to resolve a clearly
1156 S. E. 426 (Va. 1931).
2VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 5584. The section provides: "The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation or by an infant
passes the property therein notwithstanding that from want of capacity the
corporation or infant may incur no liability."
Negotiation of bearer paper by delivery does not seem within the purview
of this section, but there would seem no reason to discriminate between
transfer and indorsement, save the obviously greater hardship of disaffirmanco
on remote parties in the former instance.
' Grey v. Cooper, 3 Dougl. 65 (1782) ; Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187 (1803);
Frazier v. Massey, 14 Ind. 382 (1860) ; Blake v. Livingston County, 61 Barb.
149 (N. Y. 1871); Dulty v. Brownfield, 1 Pa. St. 497 (1845).
This rule
is rested on the ground that the infant's privilege is personal and cannot
be availed of by others liable on the strument. Where an infant is payee,
it is also said that the maker, drawer and acceptor are estopped to gainsay
his competency. See STORy, PRoMIssoRY NOTES (5 ed. 1859) § 80. The
Negotiable Instruments Law so provides: NEG. INSMr. LAW, § § 60, 61, 62(2).
Of. BiLLs op Exc. AcT, § 55(1) (6).
'This did not escape the critical scrutiny of Dean Ames. In his famous
critique of the then newly drafted Uniform Act, he pointed out this ambiquity
and suggested that, if the provision operated to render the transfer of
property irrevocable where the indorsee knew of the incapacity, it went "unnecessarily far". See Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14
HARv. L. REv. 241, 247; The Negotiable Instruments Law-One Word More
(1901) ibid. 442, 445. Both Judge Brewster and Professor MeKeehan were
convinced that Section 22 did not purport to affect the infant's powers at
common law. See Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(1901) 10 YALE L. J. 84; McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, A
Beview of the Ames-Brewster Controversj (1902) 41 AM. L. RM. 499.
Arthur Cohen, Q. C., in a letter to Judge Brewster, expressed the opinion that
the American provision was in substance similar to the corresponding section
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defined conflict of two social interests, both judicially sanctioned
and both very real, however imponderable.' In choosing to sacrifice the security of mercantile transactions to the protection of
minors, the court followed the easier course. It relied on the
venerable canon of construction that "a statute will not be construed as changing the common law beyond what is expressly
stated or necessarily implied."
The court took cognizance of,
but only to reject,' the view ably presented by Professor Chafee
in his recent edition of Bran-na that a statute evincing a broad
legislative purpose should be construed in the light thereof, even at
the price of limiting those common law rules which iiiay be in
conflict with that purpose.
Yet the common law itself exerts little compulsion toward
the result reached in the Strothers case. The power9 of an infant
to disaffirm his contractual liability as maker," drawer,' or inof the British Bills of Exchange Act, of which Mr. Cohen was one of the
framers. The British provision "(45 & 46 VIcT. c. 61, § 22 (2)), although by
no means explicit, is more susceptible of the construction that the infant's
power of disaffirmance remains unaffected thereby. See, for Mr. Cohen's
observations, Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law--A Bej7er to
Dean Ames (1901) 15 HAIv. L. Rrv. 26, 38.
The utter dearth of information respecting the operation of most rules
of law renders the evaluation of such competing interests extremely speculative, if not impossible. It is not difficult to couch a legal discussion in
terms of "social interests" (see, e. g., Levitt, The Interests Secured by the
Law Governing the Contracts of an Infant (1922) 94 CENT. L. J. 4), but
the writer must-resign himself to the fact that to do so merely points a way
of approach to the question at issue. Moreover, to translate to the realm of
"lsocial interests" a question so seldom litigated may seem an indulgence in
hyperbole. It has, however, ramifications in other fields of commercial law.
See0 note 28, infra.
See 156 S. E. at 428.
'See ibid.
8See Ba.&NNAN's NEGOTIABLE ThSTRUhENTS Lsw (4 ed. 1926) 180, where
Professor Chafee, in addition to warning against the "infantile paralysis"
produced by exaggerated protection of minors in situations of this nature,
cites authority sustaining his suggested approach to problems of statutory
construction.
0
f. HOHFELD, FuNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTONS (1923) 50 et seq. The
complex alteration of the legal relationships between the infant and the other
party to the transaction disaffirmed has been described in Holfeldian terminology by Professor Goble. See Goble, Infant's Contracts for the Sale of
Chattels (1925) 20 ILL. L. REv. 343.
'OHoward v. Simplins, 70 Ga. 322 (1883); Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245
(1882); Des Moines Ins. Co. v. McIntire, 99 Ia. 50, 68 N. W. 565 (1896);
Goodsell
v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479 (N. Y. 1830).
5
Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. 552 (1808) ; In re Soltykoff [1891] 1 K. B.
413; of. Gibbs v. Merrill, 3 Taunt. 307 (1810); Holmes v. Blagg, 8 Taunt.
35 (1817).
" Williams v. Harrison, Carth. 160 (1690).
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dorser l of a negotiable instrument, even as against bona fide purchasers, is, of course, well established, subject, in some jurisdictions, to qualifications which cannot be discussed with profit in
this note.!' Singularly little authority is to be found, however, as
to the disaffirmance of the transfer. Only a few cases' prior to
the Uniform Act present the problem; none decide it. Where
previous commentators on the law of bills and notes had left the
problem open,'8 Story asserted, without citation of authority, that
"the infant may indeed avoid it [the transfer], and intercept the
payment to the indorsee, or by giving notice to the antecedent
parties of his avoidance, furnish to them a valid defense against
IsThis is implicit in § 22 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, supra n. 3.
And4 see Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272, 274 (1818).
" Infants have been held liable in a number of cases on notes given for
necessaries. See (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 1133 and (1930) 43 HAnV. L. REV.
498, where this relaxation of the infant's power of disaffirmance is criticized
on the ground that his liability for necessaries is quasi-contractual only..
Jurisdictions so holding would doubtless apply the same rule to the indorsement of a note in return for necessaries. In such a situation, should the
infant seek to disaffirm his indorsement and recover the instrument, a plea
setting forth the delivery of necessaries would seem an answer to the action,
and, therefore, the problem of the principal case would not arise.
Usually the requirement that the infant restore the consideration so received is not deemed a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of
disaffirmance, bit some cases have so held. The infant is often said to be
subject to a liability to return such of the consideration as has not been
destroyed or wasted. For a collection of pertinent cases, see 31 0. J. 1022,
1069-1070. Interesting comments on the effect of the infant's fraudulent
representation as to age may be found in (1927) 27 Co L. L. Rv. 466;
(1927) 21 IiL. L. REv. 810.
5In Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187 (1802), a bill drawn by two infants
was wrongfully negotiated by the payee to the plaintiff who brought action
against the acceptor after having refused a demand by the drawers for the
return of the bill. In disposing of the defendant's attempt to set up this
fact as a defense, Lord Ellenborough pointed out that the drawers might
have made a new promise after attaining majority, and added at p. 188, "It
would injure the circulation of bills very materially if such facts were inquired into". This decision is conclusive against the right of an antecedent
party to assert the infant's demand, but quaere whether the same result
would have followed had the infants brought action directly against the
indorsee?
In Roach v. Woodhall, 91 Tenn. 206, 18 S.W. 407 (1891), the administrator of a deceased minor payee brought suit in equity to recover the note in
the hands of a bona fide purchaser and to collect the proceeds from the
makers. The court decreed in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that the
payee's indorsement was forged, but in a considered dictum stated that the
minor might have recovered from the transferee on the ground that the
transferee should be charged with notice of the indorser's incapacity.
In Willis v. Twambly, 13 Mass. 204 (1816), a case in which the maker
of a non-negotiable note was permitted to plead payment to the infant "indorser" who had disaffirmed its transfer, the court expressly left open the
question presented by negotiable notes.
" Neither Chitty nor Bayley discusses the question. See CHiTTY, Brans
(7th Am.ed. 1830) 16-17, 111; BAYLEY, BILmS (Am. ed. 1826) 34.
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the claim of the indorsee.' " The principal and one earlier case,
Murray v. Thompson,' decided under the Uniform Act, recognize
this asserted power of avoidance. No case as yet has determined
how the infant might "intercept payment" after suit had been
brought on the instrument by a holder thereof,' and the statement that notice -of avoidance would furnish a defense to antecedent parties seems clearly erroneous.' Nevertheless, Story's view
has been adopted by later writers, apparently -without critical
scrutiny.'
In both the Strothers and Murray eases, primary reliance is
placed on the voidable nature of the infant's contractual undertakings. But here we are concerned not with contract but with
conveyance. The distinction is not without importance in this
connection.' Viewed from the property standpoint, the decisions
assimilate the transfer of a negotiable note to the transfer of
chattel and real property interests. There may be no need for
discrimination where the transfer attacked is confined to the very
transaction between the infant and the adult.' Narrowly con17STORY, PROMISSORY NOTES (5th ed. 1859) § 80. The proposition is repeated in substance in STORY, BrL.s OF EXCHANGE (4th ed. 1860) § 85.
136 Tenn. 118, 188 S. W. 578, L. R. A. 1917B, 1172 (1916). A valuable
note is appended to the report contained in the L. R.A. volume cited.
"In Roach v. Woodall, supra n. 14, a bill was brought by the payee's
administrator, joining the indorsee and maker as parties defendant, but the
indorsee had not begun suit. Once action has been brought, however, a maker
cannot plead the indorser's incapacity (see note 3, supra) even after notice
of the indorser's attempted disaffirmance (Taylor v. Croker, supra n. 15,
criticized in STORY, BILLS OF EXCHANGE, § 85n.)

But may not a maker

interplead the parties, as has been suggested where an equity of ownership is
asserted against an indorsee of overdue paper? See Chafee, Bights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 1104, 1141. Or may the infant join as
party to the action? Of. Warren v. Haight, 65 N. Y. 171, 178 (1875).
21Taylor v. Croker, supra n. 15. Sections 60, 61 and 62 (2) of the
Negotiable Instruments Law seem to preclude the maker, drawer, and acceptor respectively from setting up such a defense.
21 See NORTON,
BILLS & NOTES (4th ed. 1914) § 94; DANNEL, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1914) § 928.
='Thus the law wavered for a time between declaring the contractual
undertakings of infants on negotiable paper void or voidable. Swasey v.
Vanderheyden, 10 Johns. 33 (N. Y. 1813) (infant's note void); Goodsell
v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479 (N. Y. 1830) (infant's note voidable). Yet no
opinion seems to have intimated that the transfer of such an instrument
was void. See Note, L. R.A. 1917B, 1174. Cf. Chafee, op. cit. supra n. 19,

at 1109.

23Dean Ames, Professor Chafee and Professor McKeehan seem desirous of
protecting the "innocent" indorsee, even though he may have dealt directly
with the infant.

See BRANNAN'S

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAw (4th ed.

1926) 179-180; McKeehan, op. cit. supra n. 4, at 501. But ignorance of an
infant's minority is not recognized as a defense for the adult, and an adult
is no more deserving of judicial sympathy when he gets a note than when
he gets a chattel. The immediate transferee although "innocent" does have
a reasonable opportunity to protect himself; not so a remote party.
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strued, the Murray case goes no farther.' Where, however, the
rights of a remote party intervene, the analogy becomes delusive.
That the infant's right rises superior to the third party's is well
settled in the realty cases,' but only meagre authority sustains it
as to chattels," and this has been brushed aside by the Uniform
Sales Act.' The Uniform Acts governing documents of title are
less explicit and suggest interesting problems of interpretation."
To burden the vendee of realty with the risk of a prior grantor's
infancy is not unfair; such transactions are, and should be, attended by investigation and deliberation. This is much less true
of sales of chattels,' and with respect to negotiable instrunents,
there is the countervailing and dominant policy of the law merchant to free bona fide purchasers from the claims and defenses
of parties with whom they have not dealt.
These considerations suggest that a court, solicitous for the
2Here the infant's father indorsed the note with his son's consent to the
defendant who believed the father to be the payee. Thus, although the "innocence" of the deceived endorsee was beyond question, he could not claim
to be a remote party.
"Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. 329 (Va. 1859), is a leading
case. Ten other decisions to a similar effect are collected in 1 WILLISTON,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 14 n. 39.
OHill v. Anderson, 13 Miss. 216 (1845); Upshaw v. Gibson, 53 Miss.
341 (1876) ; Downing v. Stone, 47 Mo. App. 144 (1891) are the only decisions
found by the writer. In the Downing case, the court remarks, at p. 151:
"We see no reason in principle why a different rule should apply when the
subject of contract is personal rather than real property."
Substitute
"practice" for "principle", and the statement loses its axiomatic flavor.
The Uniform Sales Act, § 24, provides that any seller having a voidable
title may transfer good title to a bona fide purchaser at any time before
avoidance.
2One negotiating such a document may create in a bona fide purchaser
greater rights than the former possessed, but the Acts do not preclude an
interpretation that such rights are subject to defeasance by an infant's disaffirmance. The rights of the purchaser are measured in terms of the title of
the negotiator and of the original parties to the bill in the goods. Therefore,
where the Uniform Sales Act governs that title, the infant's power of
disaffirmance would be cut off. Relevant sections of these Acts include the
following, UNiFoRm BILLS OF LADING ACT, § § 31, 32, 38, 39; UNiORm
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, § § 41, 47, 48; FEDERAT BILLS OF LADING ACT,
49 U. S. C. A. § § 110, 111, 117, 118 (1926).
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 2, expressly states that it shall not be
construed to enlarge the powers of an infant "to make a valid indorsement".
Yet the transfer of a certificate wrongfully procured or without authority
may not, under Section 8, be rescinded against a bona fide purchaser from
the transferee. The purchaser obtains "an indefeasible right". Language
of the New York Court of Appeals is open to the construction that the Act
gives a purchaser from an infant's transferee such a right. Casey v. 1(astel,
237 N . Y. 305, 312, 142 N. E. 671, 673, 31 A. L. R. 995, 998-999 (1924).
"Professor Williston observes, "It is desirable that at some time the
title to goods bought from an infant or lunatic should be perfected, and the
advantage to trade and the stability of titles just' 'ies the diminution in the
privilege of infants and lunatics.
1 WILLIST O;, SALES, 827.
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minor and yet aware of the mercantile interests at stake, might
well adopt an intermediate position which would grant to the infant the privilege of disaffirmance only against his immediate
transferee or one taking from the latter with notice or without
giving value. To do so would not leave the infant "at the mercy
of the avaricious and unscrupulous".' The infant has a remedy
against the person from whom he has secured the instrument, and
the latter's lot, although unenviable, is no more so than that of a
seller who must restore the consideration paid by the infant for a
chattel which he has subsequently destroyed.' Nor is the infant
debarred from proceeding against his immediate transferee merely
because the latter no longer holds the note itself.' The infant has,
therefore, two weapons in his arsenal. Why must the law add a
third, which can be employed only against persons who are, to all
practical intents, unable to safeguard themselves!'
-DAvin F. CAVERS.
4' Strothers v. Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank, Mupra n. 1, at 428. Although the defendant indorsee was a remote party, the court invokes the
perils involved in permitting adults "to deal at arm's length with infants".
O1Thus, although a maker may be held liable twice, he parted with no
value in the original transaction since he gave only his note.
Casey v. Rastel, supra n. 28. In that case, the property transferred consisted of shares of stock, and the defendants held liable were the infant's
agent and his brokers. The action sounded in trover, and the court found
the conversion in the failure of the defendants to make restitution on demand. But if the infant's right to restitution were recognized as quasicontractual, the necessity for this somewhat labored theory would disappear.
03In Murray v. Thompson, supra n. 18, the court suggests that indorsees
should be "chargeable with notice" of the indorser's incapacity. Except
where inquiry is practicable-and this is not true of remote parties-this
formula merely states a result, not a reason. It is obviously unfair where the
infant has merely transferred bearer paper by delivery. Moreover, the
cases cited by the court, two dealing with notes made by lunatics and one with
a married woman's indorsement, present different considerations of policy
which render them of little assistance. It is significant that Section 22 of
the Uniform Act does not purport to affect their transactions.
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